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Abstract 
 
     Two years ago Estonia’s strategic national security and defence documents put forward 
the idea of ‘psychological defence’ as a means to protect the values and cohesion of 
Estonian society from subversive influences. The idea drew sharp criticism from some 
sections of society for being inappropriate for a democratic state, even though the 
intentions behind it were noble. The paper suggests that ‘societal resilience’ is a more 
attractive and relevant concept in strategy making because it reflects the inherent 
complexity of states, societies and their highly dynamic threat environments without 
carrying negative and antagonistic connotations. It is argued that by focusing on the 
constituent elements of ‘societal resilience’, e.g. human and social capital, Estonia can 
better prepare for a wide range of security stressors than by pursuing ‘psychological 
defence’. In addition, ‘societal resilience’ offers a more appealing narrative for engaging the 
non-governmental sector and civil society in national security affairs, and even for putting 
them at the forefront of national security efforts (a ‘whole-of-society approach’). The paper 
also examines the practices for building ‘military resilience’ and their relevance to society at 
large. 
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 Introduction 
1.  Estonia’s National Security Concept (NSC) and its National Defence Strategy 
of 2010 place a strong emphasis on ‘psychological defence’ as a means to protect 
Estonian society against subversive influences and to enhance the will of the nation to 
defend itself. The NSC defines psychological defence as the “development, preservation 
and protection of common values associated with social cohesion and the sense of 
security,” the aim of which is “to safeguard the security and safety of state and society, 
to enhance the sense of security, to avert crisis and to increase trust amongst society 
and towards the actions taken by the state” (Riigikogu, 2010: 20). At various points the 
NSC also emphasises social cohesion and the resilience of critical services as factors 
enhancing national security in times of crisis. According to it, social cohesion is pursued 
by means of social (e.g. promoting greater involvement) and economic (e.g. ensuring 
high employment) policies. 
2.   Precise mechanisms – means and ways – for implementing psychological 
defence are not clearly defined in the national policy. In the Estonian public debate, 
however, the term ‘psychological defence’ has already prompted some serious 
controversy (see Poom, 2010; Raud, 2011). It seems that many observers associate the 
meaning of psychological defence with informational or even mind manipulation 
conducted by the government for some nefarious purposes. Psychological defence as a 
strategic concept and a narrative to engage members of society thus runs a substantial 
risk of causing negative reactions in a democratic society, becoming a self-defeating 
concept which fosters distrust and discord.  
3.   Furthermore, focusing on subversive (“anti-Estonian”, as the NSC puts it) 
influences aimed at eroding values and social cohesion, psychological defence also 
neglects to address the vulnerability of society to psychological shocks caused by such 
stressors as terrorist attacks, natural disasters, industrial emergencies, financial 
collapses, cyber attacks and other contingencies as a result of which the sense of 
security in society can be profoundly affected. In this regard, it is basically a ‘one-trick 
pony’ which may serve national security in a limited range of circumstances. This is 
partly compensated for by the attention paid in the NSC to the resilience of physical 
infrastructure and critical services, but the NSC does not provide an overarching 
concept to address the psychological well-being of the individual members, families and 
communities of society, and society at large, in the event of crisis. 
4.   It can also be argued that ‘defence’ is not the best term to be used in a 
discourse about society’s responses to psychological stressors – chronic or acute – since 
it implies resistance and therefore a threshold beyond which defence may collapse, 
exposing society and its members to most harmful consequences which were supposed 
to be avoided in the first place. In this paper, we argue that ‘societal resilience’ is a 
more constructive term which should be used in the national security discourse instead 
of ‘psychological defence’ and which goes well beyond ‘social cohesion’ and the 
‘resilience of critical services’. It offers a way of ensuring psychological well-being, 
perseverance and recovery in national security crises and emergencies of very diverse 
nature without carrying the negative connotations of ‘psychological defence’.  
5.   To a certain extent ‘societal resilience’ can also borrow from a similar 
concept of ‘military resilience’, which constitutes the bedrock for building an effectively 
operating organisation whose members come under intense physical, emotional and 
mental duress as part of their daily functioning. We argue that some techniques for and 
approaches to building military resilience are relevant to the achievement of societal 
resilience, although there are certain limitations too. 
6.   Our aim is to discuss ‘societal resilience’, its constituent elements, methods 
for its achievement and – if ‘societal resilience’ is to be instrumental in advancing 
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national security – the applicable requirements for the national policy. We also seek to 
discuss ‘military resilience’ and draw parallels with ‘societal resilience’ in order to 
expand the possibilities for achieving the latter and to underline the difficulties with 
transferring elements of a seemingly similar concept from one organisational 
environment to another. We hope this will provide a productive alternative to the term 
‘psychological defence’ in the public national security discourse. 
I. Resilience in general 
 
7.   The term ‘resilience’ is used in many contexts. It originates from the field of 
ecology, where it was initially understood as “the measure of the ability of an ecosystem 
to absorb changes and still persist,” although the ecological definition evolved over time 
(see Mayunga, 2007: 2). The concept appeared attractive to other fields, especially 
those involving the management of complex interlinked systems, and therefore it 
spread beyond its original uses in ecology. It is now employed at different levels 
(individual, community, state) and in different fields such as psychology, physical 
infrastructure management, economy, organisational management, community studies, 
and so on. 
 
8.   So far, its most popular use in the field of security pertains to disaster 
preparedness and terrorism studies (see Spilerman & Stecklov, 2009; Coaffee, 2006; 
Coaffee & Rogers, 2008; Rahman, 2009; Furedi, 2007; Boin & McConnell, 2007; Lee & 
Preston, 2011). Interest in resilience grew particularly after such events as the 9/11 
attacks and the Asian tsunami of 2006, although in some countries which have had to 
deal with terrorism (e.g. Israel) or natural disasters (e.g. Japan, Bangladesh) almost on a 
routine basis, resilience has long been established as a pivotal concept in framing 
national security thinking and behaviour. An increasingly complex, unpredictable and 
volatile security environment prompted a growing interest in and the acceptance of 
resilience as a key strategy in coping in this kind of environment. 
 
9.   In general, resilience has been defined as a “process linking a set of 
adaptive capacities to a positive trajectory of functioning and adaptation after a 
disturbance” (Norris et al., 2008: 130), as “successful adaptation to stressful events, 
oppressive systems, and other challenges of living” (Sonn & Fisher, 1998: 458) or simply 
as the “process of reintegrating from disruptions in life” (Richardson, 2002: 309). These 
definitions imply that resilience is a process, although it can also be seen as a strategy, a 
theory or a metaphor (Norris et al., 2008) or as the “capability of a system to maintain 
its functions and structure in the face of internal and external change and to degrade 
gracefully when it must” (Allenby & Fink, 2005: 1034). 
 
10.   It could be useful to define resilience as a “set of networked adaptive 
capacities” whereby resilience draws on certain resources of the system and on 
“dynamic attributes of those resources (robustness, redundancy, rapidity)” (Norris et al., 
2008: 135). This perspective allows a proactive approach to building resilience by means 
of accumulating necessary resources in a system and ensuring that those resources 
possess the dynamic attributes required at a time when disruptions occur. System 
managers can thereby devise policies (e.g. principles, norms and standards, priorities of 
investments) which are conducive to resilience. Furthermore, it underlines the 
importance of a holistic approach, whereby various aspects, levels and dimensions of 
resilience are treated as inter-related and given equal consideration at all levels and in 
all dimensions of analysis (see de Terte et al., 2009, on an integrated approach to 
psychological resilience; Little, 2004, on a holistic strategy for urban resilience). 
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11.   In defining a resilience strategy, it is important to appreciate the type and 
the nature of disruption. Usually, this is a traumatic event or experience which shocks a 
system and disrupts its normal functioning by causing its various elements to fail or 
underperform. Stressors or “aversive circumstances that threaten the well-being or 
functioning” (Norris et al., 2008: 131) can differ not only in terms of their nature (e.g. 
environmental disasters, terrorism, war, loss of a family member, etc.), but also in terms 
of severity, duration and surprise, which all may require different resources and 
capacities to deal with. It has already been pointed out in literature that systems which 
experience a single catastrophic event (e.g. the 9/11 attacks) display different adaptive 
behaviours compared to those which try to cope with chronic stressors (e.g. prolonged 
terrorist campaigns, shelling of residential areas, economic crises, etc.) (see Spilerman & 
Stecklov, 2009; Ganor & Ben-Lavy, 2003). However, the variety and the dynamic nature 
of potential stressors mean that it is impossible to predict in advance which adaptive 
capacities of a system will be necessary, thereby calling for a broad-based approach to 
building resilience. Thus resilience is a “rational strategy when the probability and 
specifics of a particular challenge are difficult to define” (Allenby & Fink, 2005: 1034). 
 
12.   It is important to highlight that resilience and resistance are two distinct 
types of coping with stressors. According to Norris et al. (2009: 130), resistance means 
the mobilisation and the deployment of a system’s resources to cope with the 
immediate effects of the stressors and to ensure a return to normal functioning of the 
system in a pre-event environment.1 However, it is suggested that total resistance is 
“rare in the cases of severe, enduring or highly surprising events” which significantly 
alter the environment. In a transformed environment, resilience – successful adaptation 
of a system to adverse circumstances and the eventual establishment of something 
which is often termed ‘new normalcy’ (see Buzzanell, 2010) – is a more appropriate 
strategy. Resistance rather than the exercising of resilience may produce a persistent 
dysfunction in a system in an altered environment. Resilience, on the other hand, is 
“more than hardiness and the ability to endure pain; it refers to the ability to find 
unknown inner strengths and resources in order to cope effectively with long-term 
pressures <…> Resilience is therefore the ultimate measure of adaptation and flexibility” 
(Ganor & Ben Levy, 2003: 106). 
 
II. Societal resilience 
 
13.   Societal (or social) resilience is defined as the “ability of a nation-state to 
preserve the cohesion of its society when it is confronted by external and internal 
stresses caused by socio-political change and/or violent disturbances” (Long, 2008: 2). It 
is similar to the concept of community resilience, or a “community’s inherent capacity, 
hope and faith to withstand major trauma, overcome adversity and to prevail with 
increased resources, competence and connectedness” (Landau, 2007: 352). According to 
de Terte et al. (2009: 24), what is “key to a community is that it operates based on a 
social network whereby people interact with one another in some way.” Therefore 
much of what is written on community resilience is applicable at the level of society at 
large, just as many elements of individual and family resilience feed into community 
resilience in the model of ‘linking human systems’ (see Landau, 2007) or in a 
multisystem approach to trauma recovery and resilience (see Walsh, 2007).  
                                                 
1 According to Maru (2010: 11), “most applications of the resilience concept on individual and social systems if not explicit 
have at least implicit steady-state (an equilibrium) assumption that the entity has to hold onto or bounce back to after a 
perturbation. Resistance and recovery are key elements of the idea of resilience in individual and social studies.” This stands in 
contrast to an ecological or socio-ecological perspective, whereby resilience is understood as the ability to absorb the impact, 
to self-organise and to adapt to a new, post-disturbance environment (see Carpenter et al., 2001). In our view, the latter 
perspective is more appropriate for complex and dynamic systems which constantly undergo incremental changes and 
occasionally more fundamental paradigm shifts and transformations (such as a society or national security system). 
  
Towards a resilient society, or why Estonia does not need ‘psychological defence’ 
 
ICDS Occasional Paper 
ISSN 2228-0294 
 
6 
 
14.   Certainly, communities may defy geographical boundaries of nation-states 
and their societies (e.g. religious communities, virtual communities of shared interest, 
etc.). A person can belong to several communities simultaneously, although he/she will 
always be rooted in what Sonn and Fisher (1998: 461) call “primary communities” – the 
ones that “provide the values, norms, stories, myths and a sense of historical 
continuity.” What makes communities and societies similar in principle is that they are 
social networks of interacting people who share certain values, norms, principles, 
interests, needs, myths and history. Therefore the logic of societal resilience is not that 
different from that of community resilience. 
 
15.   Ganor and Ben-Lavy (2003: 106) have outlined six major ingredients (or six 
Cs) of community resilience: (1) communication about the situation, threats, risks and 
available support; (2) cooperation, especially responsibility on a local level rather than 
expecting external help; (3) cohesion through displays of sensitivity and mutual support; 
(4) coping or the ability to take action and deal with trauma; (5) credibility of leadership, 
especially at grass-roots level; and (6) credo for a better, inspiring future. According to 
them, “the good news is that community resilience does not have to be specifically 
created; it grows by itself. It is actually a by-product of the investment in community 
development in many areas, seemingly unrelated to resilience <…> The bad news is that 
resilience cannot be achieved overnight” (ibid.). 
 
16.   Societal resilience taps into society’s own inner resources and capacities 
(skills, relationships, assets, values, norms, etc.), built over a long period of time and in 
areas which may appear as having little to do with national security in general or with 
resilience specifically. Societal resilience is often viewed as society’s resources and 
capacities which are nurtured by society itself through its institutions, interactions and 
experiences. Norris et al. (2008) distinguish a set of four inter-related types of resources 
upon which societal resilience rests (see Figure 1):  
 
(1) Economic development, which includes such parameters as resource volume 
and diversity, the equity of resource distribution, the fairness of risk and 
vulnerability to hazards. In this set, economic growth, employment 
opportunities and accessible services, such as health care, housing and schools, 
are very important ingredients. It was noted that groups on lower socio-
economic levels of development tend to suffer more adverse consequences 
from stressors compared to those on higher levels of development. 
 
(2) Social capital. This is a resource derived from the web of social relationships. It 
refers to levels of social support in times of need, the sense of community, 
formal (organisational) and informal ties linking members of society and their 
sense of attachment to a place. Citizen participation and leadership with well-
defined roles, structures and responsibilities are considered to be especially 
important for social capital and thus societal resilience. 
 
(3) Community competence, which refers to society’s knowledge, problem-solving 
skills and abilities for collaborative action; in other words, collective efficacy. 
This resource depends on critical reflection skills, a willingness to contribute, an 
ability to solve conflicts in groups and to reach consensus, empowerment and 
opportunities for getting involved in collective decision-making. It also requires 
a “culture that permits challenges to authority and institutions that provide a 
basis for coordinating a response” (ibid. 142). 
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(4) Information and communication, which include trusted sources of accurate 
information, effective transmission mechanisms and collective narratives which 
“give the experience shared meaning and purpose” (ibid. 140). In shaping this 
resource, the media plays an extremely important role. For instance, 
inaccurate, exaggerated and dramatising stories may establish narratives not 
conducive to societal resilience and prompt inadequate political reactions to 
stressors. As Lee and Preston (2011: 3) put it, “the public can be swayed by the 
most vocal, the most active or the most politically powerful participant rather 
than the best informed or the most legitimate.” Thus the responsibility of the 
media is a critical ingredient in strengthening societal resilience.2 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Community resilience as a set of networked adapted capacities (Norris et al., 2008: 136). 
 
17.  The community disaster resilience model of Mayunga (2007: 6) also draws 
attention to different forms of capital upon which resilience depends. These are: (1) 
social capital (trust, norms and networks) which facilitates coordination, cooperation 
and access to resources; (2) economic capital (income, savings and investments) which 
speeds recovery processes, increases well-being and decreases poverty; (3) human 
capital (education, health, skills and knowledge/information) which increases awareness 
of risks and the ability to manage them; (4) physical capital (housing, public facilities and 
businesses/industry) which facilitates communication and transportation and increases 
safety; and (5) natural capital (resources stocks, land, water and ecosystems) which 
sustains all forms of life, protects the environment and buttresses protection against 
natural disasters (see Figure 2). 
                                                 
2 Social media is on the rise and gaining more importance as a channel of communication for individuals, communities, 
organisations and governments during crisis. Its impact on societal resilience is yet to be studied, although it is obvious that 
there are both risks and opportunities to resilience-based strategies flowing from growing reliance on social media (see Morie 
& Chance, 2012, on the use of social networks for building team resilience). 
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 Figure 2: Forms of capital and indicators of resilience (Mayunga, 2007: 6). 
 
18.   Although Mayunga’s model was specifically designed with disaster 
resilience in mind, its forms of capital echo many of the networked resources in the 
model of Norris et al. (e.g. economic development, social capital, community 
competence). This further highlights that resilience is very broad-based (i.e. flows from a 
broad range of sources) and that society’s strengths and weaknesses are its key 
determinants. In terrorism studies, for instance, resilience has already been accepted as 
a vital ingredient of a broader strategy of ‘deterrence through denial’: resilient societies 
are difficult to coerce by means of violent acts which, in turn, denies terrorists the 
benefits they seek and discourages and deters them from further attacks. According to 
Gearson (2012: 191): 
 
 Clearly there are political contexts where the incidence of non-state violence 
against target communities will transcend short-term deterrent messages, but in 
strategic terms a resilient society is one that is not only better able to withstand 
shocks, but is also confident about its ability to do so and is therefore a less 
attractive target for terrorist attack. Resilience then as not merely the capacity for 
physical recovery but of psychological grit. Terrorism’s violence as communication, 
replied to by society’s capacity for community strength and determination, which 
derives from informed and stoic acceptance of the limits of security, but also belief 
in its ability to cope with many challenges thanks to preparatory measures and 
information. 
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19.   Mayunga also makes an important contribution not only by conceptualising 
community resilience but also by offering ways for measuring it, which makes it an 
attractive strategy to public policymakers concerned with gauging progress and 
understanding how well society is prepared to cope with adversity. According to him, 
social capital is expressed in such indicators as the number of non-profit organisations 
and voluntary associations, voter participation, newspaper readership, etc.; economic 
capital is reflected in the indicators of household income, property value, employment, 
investments, etc.; human capital is measured through educational attainment, health, 
population growth, demographic features, dependence ratios, etc.; physical capital is a 
function of the number and quality of housing units, shelters, critical infrastructure, etc.; 
and natural capital can be measured through water, air and soil quality, the size of forest 
or wetland areas, nature reserves, etc. (Mayunga, 2007). 
 
20.   There is a great variety of international composite indices (e.g. the Gini 
index for measuring socio-economic inequality, the UN Human Development Index, the 
OECD’s Education at a Glance, etc.) and standard statistical measures in various fields 
which could give a reasonable picture of where a particular society stands in terms of its 
resilience potential. Adger (2000: 352), however, also suggests that “social resilience is 
<…> observed by examining positive and negative aspects of social exclusion, 
marginalization and social capital” expressed in income stability and distribution, 
demographic change, migration patterns, etc. It is extremely important to identify 
specific societal groups or institutions, or geographical regions (see Maru, 2010, on the 
resilience of regions) where the lack of networked resources or some elements of capital 
underpinning societal or community resilience may lead to a failure and breakdown 
once some stressors put pressure – acute or chronic – on them. According to a Chatham 
House analysis, “poor communities are more vulnerable to shocks – but they are also 
more likely to be marginalized economically, politically or socially” (Lee & Preston, 2011: 
14). Thus increasing social and economic development, reducing social vulnerability and 
poverty of such groups and regions should mean enhancing overall societal resilience 
(Djalante & Thomalla, 2010). 
 
21.   Social and human capital should be of particular interest to those 
concerned with societal resilience as a strategy to deal with various national security 
threats. For instance, according to Buzzanell (2010: 6), “the process of building and 
utilizing social capital is essential to resilience.” This entails pursuing societies which are 
built around high levels of social equity, trust, inclusion and involvement; which are 
highly educated and therefore able to critically assess risks, messages and leadership 
initiatives or to question the authorities; and which have a high density of communal 
relationships and high levels of understanding and trust between various communities 
(to which racism or ethnocentrism are particularly damaging in a multi-ethnic, multi-
cultural society – see Long, 2008). In turn, this requires sustained policies and leadership 
behaviour consistent with and conducive to social and human capital growth and the 
legitimacy of society’s institutions, values and norms. 
 
22.   Nurturing societal resilience is a complicated process in the context of 
national security. On the one hand, the intangible nature of social and human capital 
means that policymakers tend to focus on economic or physical capital which is easier to 
measure or which has greater visibility as a key ingredient of resilience. Investing 
resources, time and effort in social and human capital, which is critical to societal 
resilience but which leads to resilience as a ‘by-product’, often receives far lesser 
attention in the national security discourse. On the other hand, explicitly establishing 
the notion that social and human capital is essential to national security might 
‘securitise’ such aspects of society as education, voluntarism, community relationships 
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and inter-ethnic dialogue. This may lead to over-emphasising responding to security 
threats and risks as the main driver of social and human capital development. 
 
III. Military resilience 
 
23.   Resilience and resilience studies are a growing issue in the military (see 
McGeary, 2011). An expanding body of literature refers to the changed character of 
conflict and warfare (see, for example, Jordan et al., 2008). These changes, particularly 
the drawn-out character of conflicts (Casey, 2011) and the high relative importance of 
unconventional threats (see for description Primmerman, 2006) in modern military 
operations, have prompted the armed forces to review their planning and training 
activities in order to meet new challenges.  
24.   Traumatic stress responses caused by the threat environment of modern 
conflicts resolve over time in most individuals, even though this does not mean persons 
will not be changed (Hamaoka et al., 2010). Sophisticated programmes are created to 
increase psychological strengths of military personnel and to reduce their maladaptive 
responses in order to enhance their resilience in operations of indefinite duration and 
unprecedented complexity (Cornum et al., 2011). Separate programmes are created for 
training resilience trainers (Reivich et al., 2011). In other words, due to the need to 
prepare soldiers to deal with military combat operational stressors, the shift of emphasis 
from reactive coping to proactive coping has occurred in military research. 
Corresponding training techniques are also emerging.  
25.   In a military framework, the definition of resilience is somewhat vague and 
the concept is sometimes used in inconsistent ways. Some definitions are very narrow 
and refer to a traumatised patient’s ability to function despite his/her symptoms; some 
are wider and encompass such domains as survival, adaptation, recovery, etc. (McGeary, 
2011). For current purposes, resilience in a military context is defined as the “sum total 
of psychological processes that permit individuals to maintain or return to previous 
levels of well-being and functioning in response to adversity” (definition provided by the 
Technical Cooperation Programme, TTCP, see Bowles & Bates, 2010). As such, the 
concept can be considered a key issue because military mission readiness largely 
depends on the resilience of service members, their families, military units and 
communities. 
26.   In military studies which explore resilient responses to stressful 
circumstances, the concept of psychological hardiness is widely used. It is an important 
individual characteristic associated with stress tolerance and successful performance in 
highly demanding occupations (Bartone et al., 2008). Previous research has established 
hardiness as a dispositional factor in preserving and enhancing performance and health 
despite stressful circumstances (Maddi et al., 2006). Hardiness is facilitated by a strong 
commitment to self, an attitude of vigorousness toward the environment, a sense of 
meaningfulness and an internal locus of control (Kobasa, 1979). 
27.   There are suggestions that the critical aspect of the hardiness mechanism is 
likely to involve the interpretation of or the meaning that people attach to the events 
around them and their own place in this world of experiences. High-hardy people 
typically interpret experiences as interesting, challenging and something they can exert 
control over (Bartone, 2006). Based on that, training can be implemented so as to allow 
each individual soldier not only to manage the consequences of being exposed to 
threats, but also to avoid being traumatised in the first place – this can be done by 
strengthening their resilience before they face challenging situations (Casey, 2011). 
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28.   One training technique worth introducing here is the Comprehensive 
Soldier Fitness (CSF) programme which was developed for the specific purpose of 
increasing the resilience of soldiers and improving their performance. According to 
Casey (2011), the aim of the programme is to train soldiers to be better before 
deployment in combat, so that they will not have to get better after they return. By 
adapting to the psychological resilience level of each individual, the goal is achieved with 
a preventive approach that enhances soldiers’ psychological strengths which are already 
present in every person.  
29.   The programme is composed of four elements:3 
(1) The assessment of (emotional, social, family, spiritual) fitness: 
o A special psychometric instrument (GAT) is developed and 
used to assess soldiers’ psychosocial fitness; 
o Reassessment takes place at least once in every two years 
throughout everyone’s career, so that each soldier is able to 
monitor his/her growth, maturity and learning. 
 
(2) Individualised learning modules to improve fitness in these domains: 
o Depending on GAT results, soldiers are offered a list of 
appropriate self-development opportunities; 
o Outcomes of the courses are monitored and adjustments 
(when needed) are made when deciding what components 
from the list should be sustained, expanded or excluded. 
 
(3) Formal resilience training: 
o Already at the beginning of their initial entry into the Army, 
soldiers receive instructions on specific mental and physical 
skills to enhance performance when facing challenges; 
o Special educational modules are composed with detailed 
descriptions of outcomes concerning emotional fitness, social 
fitness, family fitness and spiritual fitness. 
 
(4) Training of Army master resilience trainers (MRT): 
o  These are primarily non-commissioned officers who have 
direct daily contact with soldiers and who are trained to deliver 
the resilience training in their units. For this purpose, a special 
resilience training programme is used, which has been 
composed in collaboration between civil and military academic 
and research institutions. 
30.   Psychological resilience in the military also appears to be 
amplifiable via leadership. For example, research has revealed that military 
leadership plays a significant role in building resilience in military units. In reference 
to the role of leaders, resilience which can be cultivated through leading by example 
is related to morale among soldiers. Leaders influence and enhance the morale of 
their subordinates by providing them with a role model to think and behave in more 
resilient ways (Bartone, 2006). In military practice, resilience can be built with the 
help of several organisations and centres available to promote resilience for military 
members, providers, units, families and communities (Bowles & Bates, 2010). 
31.   Due to its dynamic nature, it is useful to consider the Military 
Demand-Resource Model designed for the military and proposed by Bates et al. 
(2010). The aim of the MDR model is: (1) to use a strengths-based approach to 
                                                 
3 For a detailed description of implementation, see Cornum, Matthews & Seligman (2011). 
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assess what resources are available and what resources are needed based on the 
environmental demands; (2) to understand and optimise the interactions between a 
person’s mind-body internal resources and the complexities of the military’s 
demands and external resources; and (3) to assess the dynamic interaction between 
demands and resources over time. This model captures the complexity of interaction 
between human (individual level) and military (organisational level) systems. 
Together with the linkage between resilience, adaptation and wellness (Norris et al., 
2008), we can consider resilience ‘quasi-observable’ by measuring, monitoring and 
systematically studying psychological wellness indicators in the wider society too 
(e.g. the occurrence of psychopathologies, healthy patterns of behaviour, adequate 
functioning in social roles and the level of quality of life).  
32.   Programmes to strengthen the resilience of military organisations 
go above the level of individual factors to encompass factors that strengthen 
resilience in the military at family, unit and community levels. Individual capacities 
and their development are significant, but the armed forces operate as 
organisations where resilience of military units is of paramount importance to 
mission success and which, in turn, depends not only on the resilience of individuals 
comprising them. Meredith et al. (2011) list factors at family, unit and community 
levels which feed into broader military resilience (see Table 1). They find, however, 
that when it came to assessing various resilience-building programmes in the armed 
forces, “outcomes tended to be measured most frequently at the individual level, 
with fewer assessments mentioned at the family and organizational level (including 
unit)” (Meredith et al., 2011: 85). 
 
Table 1: Resilience factors at unit and community levels (Meredith et al., 2011: 50). 
 
 
33.   At first glance, the applicability of the military resilience-building 
techniques in a broader societal setting is somewhat limited. It is highly debatable 
whether a planned, directive, top-down approach inherent in the nature of 
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hierarchical organisations such as the military can work in the context of a vibrant, 
pluralist society, in which multiple – often clashing – perspectives, interests and 
groups flourish and where no single authority can strictly impose a uniform doctrinal 
solution. The complexity and the heterogeneity of society mean that such solutions 
will be either too simplistic or will be rejected by anyone feeling that the 
government is overstepping the boundaries of its authority in order to impose a 
particular mind-set in a very sensitive area of individual psyche. There is a quite 
obvious contrast between a planned and prescriptive path to achieving military 
resilience of service members on the one hand and broader collective societal 
resilience as a useful (and not necessarily assured) ‘by-product’ of investing in social 
and human capital on the other. 
 
34.  The military approach to building resilience does, however, reflect 
some of the key issues pertaining to societal resilience. First of all, it highlights the 
importance of effective leadership in nurturing resilience at many levels. Leaders are 
positive role models in situations involving chronic or acute stressors – they serve as 
a critical pathway to collective resilience both in military and broader societal 
settings. According to Powley and Lopes (2011: 29), “concerted leadership is a 
dimension [of unit and organisational resilience] that also improves the resilience 
and efficacy of organizations while simultaneously contributing to their overall 
success by binding all resilience factors together (adequate resources, organizational 
learning, and flexibility and adaptability in the face of adversity).” In addition, 
although resilience is more observable in military settings through unit and 
individual performance indicators, societal resilience can also be assessed through 
surveys of well-being and through various proxy indicators as discussed earlier, 
which makes it worthwhile to study military experiences and to incorporate them in 
assessments of societal resilience, and vice versa.  
35.   The capacities of psychological fitness (emotional, social, family and 
spiritual) underpin human flourishing not only in the armed forces but in society 
too. It must be noted that the successful demonstration of the effects of resilience 
training in soldiers and their families could also provide the basis for a model for the 
civilian world (see Seligman & Fowler, 2011), if designed and applied carefully. 
Usually, there are already multiple government-sponsored and civic support 
networks and schemes targeted at various social groups and inducing their 
hardiness in coping with adverse circumstances in life. What could be considered as 
a valuable addition based on military experiences in the field of strengthening 
individual resilience is the inclusion of formal (research evidence-based) 
psychological fitness training programmes, which could be made available both to 
members of society at large (through a national education system) and to 
community leaders who play an important role in societal resilience processes 
(through tailor-made projects and courses). 
IV. Building societal resilience in Estonia 
 
36.  In the public discourse, Estonian society is generally considered as 
rather resilient. The examples offered vary from the nation’s survival under Soviet 
occupation with the fabric of national values largely intact to the absence of any 
significant social unrest in the face of the austerity measures undertaken by the 
government and the private sector to withstand the impact of the global financial 
crisis which started in 2009. The image of a stoical and unperturbed Estonian calmly 
weathering the storms of life is congruent with the notion of resilient, high-hardy 
individuals, communities, states and societies. This anecdotal evidence of resilience 
appears to be confirmed by international statistics which may serve as a proxy 
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indicator of societal resilience, spanning human and economic capital aspects: the 
UN Human Development Index ranks Estonia as 34th, classifying it under the 
category of countries with “very high human development”, albeit below the 
average score in this category (UNDP, 2011).4 
37.   This does not mean, however, that there are no issues to be 
addressed or challenges to be overcome in moving towards an ever more resilient 
society in Estonia. For instance: 
37.1   Ever since its accession to NATO and the EU – two major 
strategic goals – Estonia has somewhat lacked a compelling, unifying and 
mobilizing vision for the future of the state and society. The definition of 
this kind of vision (“credo for a better future”) through an inclusive political 
and societal process and consensus-building is an exercise in political 
leadership and civic involvement in itself. But it is also a vital source of 
society’s resilience when dealing with turbulence and uncertainty in its 
security environment.  
37.2   There are significant regional disparities in terms of 
economic development, with peripheral counties in the north eastern, 
eastern, south eastern and southern parts of Estonia lagging far behind the 
leading regions (see Kaldaru & Paas, 2009). It is particularly alarming that 
one of these underperforming regions (Ida-Virumaa) is dominated by ethnic 
non-Estonians, thus adding an ethnic layer to the problem of insufficient 
development in certain regions. 
37.3   The level of trust within society has to be enhanced (which 
also pertains to building trust between ethnic Estonians and non-Estonians). 
This requires continuous monitoring of mutual perceptions of various social 
groups and developing the mechanisms for conducting an effective 
dialogue and establishing an enduring consensus between them.5 Political, 
civic, economic and cultural exclusion of various societal groups has to be 
avoided not only as a matter of principle in a democratic egalitarian society, 
but also because it erodes society’s resilience and, by extension, 
undermines national security.  
37.4   The level of voluntarism which could serve as one of the 
indicators of social capital is quite low in Estonia: some recent findings 
showed that only 4.5% of the population had performed voluntary work 
within a month before the survey in 2009–2010 (Kaarna & Noor, 2011: 20). 
The numbers of those involved in voluntary action from time to time (e.g. in 
large-scale civic initiatives of short duration) are higher and by some 
accounts may even reach almost half of the population (see Jõe, 2010: 104). 
However, further sustained efforts are needed to promote voluntarism in 
society as a way to develop social capital and thus increase societal 
resilience. 
37.5  The development of civil society, including various 
community networks and the networks of voluntary social and 
psychological support for individuals, families and groups, has to be actively 
                                                 
4 The UN Human Development Index is a composite of measures reflecting the standard of living (Gross National Income), 
health (life expectancy) and access to knowledge (years of schooling, etc.). It is also adjusted to reflect inequalities (such as of 
income, gender, education) within each country. 
5 A great example of the efforts made in this direction is the regular monitoring studies of the integration of Estonian society 
(i.e. focused on the integration of ethnic Estonians and non-Estonians) commissioned by the Estonian Ministry of Culture (see 
Estonian Ministry of Culture, 2011). This only serves to underline the point that national security policymakers concerned with 
societal resilience have to scan a very broad horizon of issues, including those in the remit of an organisation that clearly does 
not directly deal with national security, i.e. the Ministry of Culture. 
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encouraged and promoted at local, regional and national levels. Support for 
and the strengthening of the so-called ‘third sector’ and the mechanisms of 
governmental cooperation with it should thus form part of Estonian 
national security policy aimed at building societal resilience. As Estonian 
President Toomas Hendrik Ilves pointed out in his address upon taking his 
oath of office, “a strong third sector is the most effective safeguard against 
populism and the best self-defence in cases where a crisis or catastrophe 
befalls society” (Ilves, 2011). 
37.6   Critical thinking, risk assessment and risk management 
skills have to be developed and maintained in society, especially through 
the Estonian national education system. They are indispensable enablers of 
resilient responses to national security issues, including in situations where 
there is an active effort by hostile actors to erode trust in society and to 
undermine the fabric of its values. There are some expert opinions, 
however, that the Estonian education system is failing to promote critical 
thought and that manifestations of critical perspectives in society are often 
interpreted as acts that are harmful to the state and its image (see 
Postimees, 2011). 
37.7  The quality of leadership in politics, civil society, public 
administration and the private sector must continuously be attended to. 
Models of leadership behaviour which are conducive to societal resilience 
under various stressors and therefore to national security have to be well 
understood and practised at various levels. Such established formats as the 
Senior Courses in National Defence could be utilised to impart knowledge 
(e.g. theoretical models and case studies) about credible leadership in 
sustaining resilience during national security crises. 
37.8  More efforts have to be put into general resilience training 
of individual members of society – their sense of well-being and responses 
to various stressors eventually affect collective societal resilience.6 The U.S. 
Army’s example demonstrates it is possible to strengthen self-awareness 
and inner capacities underpinning individual resilience through 
programmes based on behavioural research. Similar programmes in the 
Estonian Defence Forces would not only enhance their organisational 
resilience but would also have a broader societal effect, especially if 
targeted at conscripts and members of the Defence League – Estonia still 
retains a strong link between society and the military through these 
institutions which can be utilised with the purpose of increasing resilience 
of individuals in society at large. Elements of resilience training could also 
be included in the Estonian upper secondary school curriculum as part of 
national defence or psychology courses. 
37.9  Crisis communication effectiveness has to be enhanced and 
maintained. This is one of the principles the Estonian government has 
endorsed in the area of crisis management, but its application is not always 
frictionless as demonstrated by the confusing information issued to the 
public during a gunman incident in the Estonian MOD building in August 
2011. The episode also highlighted the importance of media responsibility 
in ensuring reliable crisis communication and thus sustaining societal 
resilience during national emergencies. 
                                                 
6
 According to conclusions of a pan-European research consortium, “European citizens should be regarded as a decisive and 
integral part in any future Crisis Management solution.  <…> Research and innovation should analyse how the public could be 
best enabled to actively contribute to such solutions, what the key enablers are and how the public should be educated, 
trained and prepared to be ready to act accordingly when the moment is there…” (ESRIF, 2009: 114). 
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38.  The above list is not exhaustive and, of course, places an emphasis 
on investments in social, human and to a certain degree economic capital of the 
nation as critical pathways to societal resilience. It is, however, worth reminding 
ourselves that the approach to nurturing resilience has to be holistic and thus 
include investments in resilient physical infrastructure (especially critical 
infrastructure and critical information infrastructure) and in preventing the erosion 
of Estonia’s natural capital.  
Conclusions 
39.   The attraction of the concept of ‘psychological defence’ to Estonian 
policymakers and practitioners is understandable: it creates an impression that 
inputs and outputs can be controlled and therefore gives a sense of being in charge 
and proactive in managing a crucial facet of national security. It also implies that 
certain external hostile forces are actively threatening social cohesion and values of 
Estonian society, which therefore calls for active measures by the state and society 
to defend them. The latter may be true, but the variety of security threats and risks 
which may undermine the sense of security and well-being in society is far broader 
than just a chronic stressor in the form of hostile efforts by some external actor to 
sow discord in or to undermine the self-confidence of Estonian society. Resilience 
as a holistic concept is far better suited as a framework for thinking about how to 
ensure the flexibility and the adaptation of a small nation who wants to survive and 
prosper in a turbulent security environment without the risk of developing a ‘siege 
mentality’ or drawing charges of manipulation that ‘psychological defence’ is 
susceptible to. 
40.   Societal resilience provides a whole-of-government approach 
rooted in Estonia’s national security and defence policies because the nurturing of 
its constituent elements – channelling investments in various forms of national 
capital (social, human, economic, physical, natural) – is obviously something which 
can only be done by concerted long-term efforts by different organisations. 
Furthermore, due to the importance of the non-governmental sector (NGOs, the 
media, educational organisations, local communities, private enterprises) in 
enhancing societal resilience, this concept also extends well beyond the 
government and even calls for putting the non-governmental sector at the 
forefront of national security efforts (’whole-of-society’ approach), with the 
government acting mostly as a facilitator and enabler.  
41.  Notably, ‘societal resilience’ even serves as a better narrative than 
‘national security’ or ‘national defence’ (let alone ‘psychological defence’) for 
involving many organisations – both governmental and non-governmental – not 
formally related to the national security sector. These organisations often do not 
see themselves as an organic part of national security or defence policymaking and 
implementation and, indeed, are repelled by references to these fields. However, in 
times of crisis and emergency, they have a vital role to play in ensuring or restoring 
the sense of security, well-being and trust in a better future within various 
communities and within society as a whole. Success is more likely if they are 
engaged by national security policymakers with a reference to the need to 
strengthen social, human, natural and economic capital of the nation and thus to 
build its resilience capacities, drawing upon the experiences of particular 
organisations (e.g. military) when appropriate, than with calls for becoming 
involved in ‘psychological defence’. 
 
 
  
Towards a resilient society, or why Estonia does not need ‘psychological defence’ 
 
ICDS Occasional Paper 
ISSN 2228-0294 
 
17 
Literature 
Adger W. N. (2000). “Social and ecological resilience: Are they related?” Progress in Human 
Geography, 24:3, pp. 347–364. 
Allenby B., Fink J. (2005). “Toward inherently secure and resilient societies.” Science, Vol. 309, Issue 
5737, pp. 1034–1036. 
Bartone P. T. (2006). “Resilience under military operational stress: Can leaders influence hardiness?” 
Military Psychology, 18(Suppl.), S131–S148. 
Bartone P. T., Roland R., Picano J., Williams T. J. (2008). “Psychological hardiness predicts success in 
US Army Special Forces candidates.” International Journal of Selection and Assessment, 16, 78–81. 
Boin A., McConnell A. (2007). “Preparing for critical infrastructure breakdowns: The limits of crisis 
management and the need for resilience.” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Vol. 15, 
No. 1, pp. 50–59. 
Bowles S. V., Bates M. J. (2010). Military organizations and programs contributing to resilience 
building.” Military Medicine, 175, 382–385.  
Buzzanell P. M. (2010). “Resilience: Talking, resisting, and imagining new normalcies into being.” 
Journal of Communication (60), pp. 1–14. 
Carpenter S., Walker B., Anderies J. M., Abel N. (2001). “From metaphor to measurement: Resilience 
of what to what?” Ecosystems, 4, DOI: 10.1007/s10021-001-0045-9, pp. 765–781. 
Casey G. W. Jr. (2011). “Comprehensive soldier fitness.” American Psychologist, 66(1), 1–3.  
Coaffee J. (2006). “From counterterrorism to resilience.” The European Legacy, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 
389–403. 
Coaffee J., Rogers P. (2008). “Rebordering the city for new security challenges: From counter-
terrorism to community resilience.” Space and Polity, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 101–118. 
Cornum R., Matthews M. D., Seligman M. E. P. (2011).” Building resilience in a challenging 
institutional context.” American Psychologist, 66(1), 4–9. 
De Terte I., Becker J., Stephens C. (2009). “An integrated model for understanding and developing 
resilience in the face of adverse events.” Journal of Pacific Rim Psychology, Vol. 3, Issue 1, pp. 20–26. 
Djalante R., Thomalla F. (2010). “Community resilience to natural hazards and climate change 
impacts: A review of definitions and operational frameworks.” 5
th
 Annual International Workshop & 
Expo on Sumatra Tsunami Disaster & Recovery, pp. 164–178. 
Estonian Ministry of Culture (2011). “Monitoring of integration in the Estonian society in 2011.” 
[online] Available from: http://www.kul.ee/webeditor/files/integratsioon/Monitooring_2011_EN.pdf 
(Accessed: 29 June 2012). 
European Security Research and Innovation Forum (ESRIF) (2009). Final Report. [online] Available 
from: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/security/files/esrif_final_report_en.pdf (Accessed: 12 
September 2012). 
Furedi F. (2007). “The changing meaning of disaster.” Area, 39.4, pp. 482–489. 
Ganor M., Ben-Lavy Y. (2003). “Community resilience: Lessons derived from Gilo under fire.” Journal 
of Jewish Communal Service, Winter/Spring, pp. 105–108. 
Gearson J. (2012). “Deterring conventional terrorism: From punishment to denial and resilience.” 
Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 33, No. 1, pp. 171–198. 
Hamaoka D. A., Kilgore J. A., Carlton J., Benedek D. M., Ursano R. J. (2010). “Military and civilian 
disaster response and resilience: From gene to policy.” Military Medicine, 175, 32–36. 
Ilves T. H. (2011). The President of the Republic of Estonia upon taking the oath of office before the 
Riigikogu. Official speech, 10 October. [online] Available from: http://www.president.ee/en/official-
duties/speeches/6574-the-president-of-the-republic-of-estonia-upon-taking-the-oath-of-office-
before-the-riigikogu-10-october-2011/index.html (Accessed: 2 August 2012). 
Jordan D., Kiras J. D., Lonsdale D. J., Speller I., Tuck C., Walton C. D. (2008). Understanding Modern 
  
Towards a resilient society, or why Estonia does not need ‘psychological defence’ 
 
ICDS Occasional Paper 
ISSN 2228-0294 
 
18 
Warfare (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press). 
Jõe H. (2010). “Noored ja vabatahtlik tegevus” (“Youth and voluntary action”) in Parts V. (ed.), Noorte 
monitor 2009 (Youth Monitor 2009) (Tallinn: Eesti Noorsootöö Instituut), pp. 102–113. [online] 
Available from: http://www.eni.ee/sisu/4_577NOORTEMONITOR_2009.pdf (Accessed: 29 June 2012). 
Kaarna R., Noor K. (2011). Ülevaade vabatahtliku töö majandusliku ja sotsiaalse väärtuse hindamise 
võimalustest (Overview of the Possibilities for the Evaluation of the Economic and Social Value of 
Volunteer Work) (Tallinn-Tartu: PRAXIS). [online] Available from: 
http://www.praxis.ee/fileadmin/tarmo/Projektid/Valitsemine_ja_kodanike%C3%BChiskond/VKP_VAB
Amet_l6ppraport.pdf (Accessed: 29 June 2012). 
Kaldaru H., Paas T. (2009). “Sectoral structure and GDP: Is there a remarkable relationship in the case 
of the Estonian counties?” Discussions on Estonian Economic Policy, XVII, pp. 38–41. [online] 
Available from: 
http://www.mattimar.ee/publikatsioonid/majanduspoliitika/2009/04_Helje_Kaldaru_Tiiu_Paas.pdf 
(Accessed: 28 June 2012). 
Kobasa S. C. (1979). “Stressful life events, personality, and health: An inquiry into hardiness.” 
Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 1–11. 
Landau J. (2007). “Enhancing resilience: Families and communities as agents for change.” Family 
Process, Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 351–365. 
Lee B., Preston F., with Green G. (2011). Preparing for High-impact, Low-probability Events: Lessons 
from Eyjafjallajökull. Chatham House Report. [online] Available from: 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Energy,%20Environment%20and
%20Development/r0112_highimpact.pdf (Accessed: 15 June 2012). 
Little R. G. (2004). “Holistic strategy for urban security.” Journal of Infrastructure Systems, Vol. 10, No. 
2. DOI: 10.1061/(ASCE)1076-0342(2004)10:2(52), pp. 52–59. 
Long S. R. J. (2008). “Charting the Concept of Social Resilience: Past, Present, and the Future.” 
Conference Papers – International Studies Association Annual Meeting, pp. 1–16.  
Maddi S. R., Harvey R. H., Khoshaba D. M., Lu J. L., Persico M., Brow M. (2006). “The personality 
construct of hardiness, III: Relationships with repression, innovativeness, authoritarianism, and 
performance.” Journal of Personality, 74, 575–598, DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6494.2006.00385.x. 
Maru Y. T. (2010). Resilient Regions: Clarity of concepts and challenges to systemic measurement. 
CSIRO Working Paper Series (Canberra: CSIRO Sustainable Ecosystems). 
Mayunga J. S. (2007). “Understanding and applying the concept of community disaster resilience: A 
capital-based approach.” Summer Academy for Social Vulnerability and Resilience Building (Munich, 
Germany). [online] Available from: http://www.ihdp.unu.edu/file/get/3761.pdf (Accessed: 15 April 
2010). 
McGeary D. D. (2011). “Making sense of resilience.” Military Medicine, 176, 603–604.  
Meredith L. S., Sherbourne C. D., Gaillot S., Hansell L., Ritschard H. V., Parker A. M., Wrenn G. (2011). 
Promoting Pscyhological Resilience in the U.S. Military (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation). 
Morie J. F., Chance E. (2012). “Social Networks and Virtual Worlds for Building Team Resilience” in 
Social Media: Risks and Opportunities in Military Applications. Meeting Proceedings, MP-HFM-201 
(Tallinn: NATO Science and Technology Organisation). 
Norris F. H., Stevens S. P., Pfefferbaum B., Wyche K. F., Pfefferbaum R. L. (2008). “Community 
resilience as a metaphor, theory, set of capacities, and strategy for disaster readiness.” American 
Journal of Community Psychology, 41, 127–150, DOI: 10.1007/s10464-007-9156-6. 
Postimees (2011). “Saarts: kriitilist mõtlemist peetakse Eestis riigile kahjulikuks” (“Saarts: Critical 
thinking in the country is considered to be harmful”). 19 October [online] Available from: 
http://www.postimees.ee/603122/saarts-kriitilist-motlemist-peetakse-eestis-riigile-kahjulikuks/ 
(Accessed: 29 June 2012). 
Primmerman C. A. (2006). “Thoughts of the Meaning of ‘Asymmetric Threats’.” Special Report 10-
1165 (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Lincoln Laboratory). 
Poom R. (2010). “Tarbetu tundeelu julgeolekupoliitikas” (“Unnecessary emotions in security 
  
Towards a resilient society, or why Estonia does not need ‘psychological defence’ 
 
ICDS Occasional Paper 
ISSN 2228-0294 
 
19 
policy”). Eesti Päevaleht, 22 March. 
Powley E. H., Lopes J. F. (2011). Dimensions of Small Unit Resilience in Organizations Facing Threats, 
Disruption, and Stress. Technical Report: NPS-GBSPP-11-006 (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School). 
Rahman N. A. A. (2009). “The dominant perspective on terrorism and its implication for social 
cohesion: The case of Singapore.” The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies, 27 (2), pp. 109–128. 
Raud R. (2011). “Kui suurt valet me vajame?” (“How big a lie do we need?”) . Eesti Päevaleht, 24 
March. 
Reivich K. J., Seligman M. E. P., McBride S. (2011). “Master resilience training in the U.S. Army.” 
American Psychologist, 66(1), 25–34.  
Richardson G. E. (2002). “The metatheory of resilience and resiliency.” Journal of Clinical Psychology, 
58, pp. 307–321. 
Riigikogu (2010). National Security Concept of Estonia. [online] Available from: 
http://www.kaitseministeerium.ee/files/kmin/img/files/National_Security_Concept_of_Estonia.pdf 
Seligman M. E. P., Fowler R. D. (2011). “Comprehensive soldier fitness and the future of psychology.” 
American Psychologist, 66(1), 82–86.  
Sonn C. C., Fisher A. T. (1998). “Sense of community: Community resilient responses to oppression 
and change.” Journal of Community Psychology, Vol. 26, No. 5, pp. 457–472. 
Spilerman S., Stecklov G. (2009). “Societal Responses to Terrorist Attacks.” The Annual Review of 
Sociology, 35, pp. 167–189. 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2011). Sustainability and Equity: A Better Future 
for All. Human Development Report 2011. [online] Available from: 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2011_EN_Complete.pdf (Accessed: 22 December 2011). 
Walsh F. (2007). “Traumatic loss and major disasters: Strengthening family and community 
resilience.” Family Process, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 207–227. 
 
